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A RESPONSE TO MR. Y'BARBO'S REPLY
L. Ray Patterson*
This is a response to Mr. Y'Barbo's reply to the article by me and
Judge Birch, who, in view of the constraints of his office, has left
the task wholly to me.
Perhaps the least salutary feature of American society is the
extent to which special interest groups shape the law in the
legislative process as it affects them. Bankers influence banking
legislation, securities firms influence securities law, and lawyers
influence legislation according to their special interest, plaintiff
lawyers opposing, defense lawyers promoting, tort reform. No
special interest group has been more successful in this endeavor
than copyright owners, a success that entitles them to the epithet
of copyrightists.1
That Mr. Y'Barbo is a copyrightist is suggested by three ideas he
expresses in his article:
- that first amendment protections are already embedded in
contemporary copyright law;
- that copyright is intended to provide the proper balance
between author and author (so that the public is not a part
of the copyright equation); and
- that the consumer/competitor distinction in copyright law is
absurd.
These three ideas support the natural law concept of copyright,
which in practical terms means the copyright umbrella can be
extended to new communications technology with little or no
change. Maintaining the status quo, of course, is important for
copyrightists because change may inhibit their expansion of the
copyright monopoly by privatizing copyright law. Thus, if first
amendment protections are already embedded in contemporary
* Pope Brock Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
1 Professor Jessica Litman has proved this point in two articles: Jessica D. Litman,
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987); Jessica D.
Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).
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copyright law, the first amendment is less likely to be used to
prevent the process of privatization; if copyright is to provide a
proper balance between author and author, the impact of copyright
on the consumer is not a matter of concern; and if the distinction
between the consumer using the work and the competitor infringing
the copyright is rejected, it frees the copyright owner to license the
use of copies of copyrighted works after they have been sold and
placed on the library shelf. This is because for infringement
purposes, the distinction between the use of the work by the
consumer and the use of the copyright by the competitor is
eliminated.
The right to license the use of copies that have left the stream of
commerce, of course, is an enormous expansion of the copyright
monopoly, and monopoly is the natural predicate for censorship.
But if one only transmits the work via television or the computer,
arguably the work remains in the stream of commerce, a justifica-
tion for licensing access to, and use of, the work. The ideas that
first amendment protections are embedded in copyright law and
that there is no distinction between the consumer and competitor
thus serve as a shield to protect the practice of private censorship
in the form of licensing the right to read works, whether published
or transmitted through the ether.
The predicate for this scenario is that the purpose of copyright is
to protect author against author rather than to benefit the public.
But neither the copyright statute, precedent, nor reason supports
that position. The statutory right of fair use mandates that the
public be a part of the copyright equation.2 And precedent against
the parochial function of copyright is found in both the copyright
clause of the U.S. Constitution and rulings of the Supreme Court.
The first says that Congress shall have the power to promote the
progress of learning, a goal that, one can reasonably assume, is not
limited to authors but includes the public at large.' Indeed,
evidence to support this view is found in President George Wash-
ington's message to Congress that preceded the enactment of the
2 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
3 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, c1. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.*).
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1790 Copyright Act.4 More recent precedent is the several rulings
of the U.S. Supreme Court that copyright is primarily to benefit the
public, only secondarily to benefit the author.5 Clearly, then, the
Supreme Court views the public interest as an important compo-
nent of copyright law.
The idea that copyrightists use to demean the public interest in
copyright law-that the raison d'etre of copyright is to induce
authors to create works-is a stale fiction that has been used for
centuries by publishers in their lobbying efforts in legislative bodies
and litigation efforts in courts. In 1643, for example, the booksell-
ers of London petitioned Parliament for new censorship legislation
that would protect their copyrights, arguing that without such laws,
authors could not feed their families and "many pieces of great
worth and excellence will be strangled in the womb.' More
recently, in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,' the court
reasoned that if it did not grant the copyright holder the right to
license others (for a fee) to copy an article for research purposes,
authors would not be able to support their families.'
Both arguments are suspect, the first because in 1643 the author
in England was not entitled to copyright, which had been developed
by, for, and limited to printers and publishers, the second because
' "[There is nothing which can better deserve your patronage than the promotion of
science and literature. Knowledge is, in every country, the surest basis of public happiness."
GEORGE WASHINGTON, AN ADDRESS TO THE 1ST CONGRESS (1790), reprinted in COPYRIGHT
iN CONGRESS, 1789 TO 1904 at 115 (Thorvald Solberg ed., 1905).
' See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1884
(1994) (The primary objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original
literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public."); Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275, 1279 (1991) ("The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward 'the labor of authors, but [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.' "); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 672 (1984) ("The monopoly privileges that Congress
may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private
benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achievedL"); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158, 77 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
243, 253 (1948) (The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration."); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ('The sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the (copyright] monopoly
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.*).
6 1 A TRANSCRIPT OF THE STATIONER'S REGISTEIS 587 (Edward Arber ed., 1875).
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the subject of the litigation in Texaco was articles in learned
journals, the authors of which, as is customary, received no
compensation. One may reasonably ask: is an uncompensated
author deprived of resources to support his or her family when the
purchaser of a publication in which the writing appears makes a
personal copy for research purposes? An affirmative answer comes
very close to suggesting phantom reasoning, which is the natural
companion of legal fictions in that its foundation is ideas generated
by emotion rather than logic.
The notion that copyright is a muse for authors that must be
managed so as to enable authors to use each other's works in
creating their own is a classic example of phantom reasoning.
Consider the fact that England's greatest authors-Chaucer,
Shakespeare, and Milton-wrote without the benefit of copyright.
Moreover, one can reasonably infer that it is not copyright, but the
desire to express oneself as a result of talent that causes aspiring
authors to occupy the proverbial garret in a starving state.
Reason in support of the notion that the public is only an
incidental beneficiary of copyright is weak because no one, in so far
as I know, has explained why the beneficiaries of so important and
pervasive body of law as a copyright should be limited to one class
of persons, namely authors, real and fictional in the form of
corporate employers. That copyright is solely for the benefit of
authors, of course, is the extreme formulation of the natural law
copyright, resting on the notion that an author is entitled to
copyright because he or she created the work, an idea that assumes
a fantastical quality when applied to corporate entities. But as the
corporate application shows, the natural law copyright is both trite
and banal, trite because it has no condition other than creation,
and banal because its only beneficiary is the author, real or
fictional. Surprisingly, however, Mr. Y'Barbo will find support for
his position in the early English copyright, a private-law copyright
that was limited to printers and publishers, which lasted in
perpetuity, and protected only the copyright owner. The weakness
in this evidence, of course, is that the private copyright was limited
to entrepreneurs and did not encompass the creator.
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The Statute of Anne--the first English copyright statute that
served as model for the U.S. Copyright Act of 1790-created the
first public law copyright and for the first time gave the author the
ownership of the copyright of his or her work. The new statutory
copyright, however, did not come into existence until the work was
printed. Except for this change and the limited term, the new
public law copyright retained the essential features of its predeces-
sor, presumably because of its long-continued existence. Although
the ownership of the statutory copyright was initially vested in the
author, the change proved at first to be more cosmetic than
substantive. This was because the publishers ignored the chang-
es.10 Even so, conscious of the resentment against the monopoly
that the earlier copyright represented, publishers managed to
obscure the fact that copyright continued to be a publisher's
monopoly by claiming that copyright was an author's right. The
author, in short, was the shield for the monopoly of the publishers,
who never publicized the fact that despite the Statute of Anne they
were the copyright owners (as assignees of authors).
The early private-law copyright, of course, was a natural law
copyright based on the sweat-of-the-brow rather than creative
effort, which Parliament rejected when it enacted the Statute of
Anne and made copyright a statutory grant. This English history
is relevant today for two reasons. First, the language of the
copyright clause is taken directly from the title of the Statute of
Anne, the model for the 1790 Copyright Act.1 Consequently,
litigation by the booksellers in eighteenth century England, brought
in an effort to negate the limitations on copyright that the Statute
of Anne imposed, resulted in a House of Lords decision in 177412
that constitutes an annotation of the copyright clause, drafted in
1787.
'Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.).
1 This is made apparent in the debate in the House of Commons on the Booksellers' Bill
(to extend the term of copyright), which was introduced immediately after the House of Lords
had rendered its decision in Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408,98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774),
in which the Lords rejected the booksellers claim that copyright was a natural law right that
existed in perpetuity. 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803. 1078-1110 (London, William Cobbett ed. 1771-1774).
"1 1790 Act, 1 Stat. 124; 1st Cong., 2d Sess., c. 15.90 Act.
12 Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).
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The second reason for the relevance of English history is the
lobbying efforts of copyrightists directed to reviving the features of
the early private-law copyright with the use of fictions. The two
most notable fictions are: 1) that the transmission of electronic
signals become a writing if they are recorded as they are broadcast;
and 2) that the employer of an author who creates a work in the
course of his or her employment is deemed to be the author.13
Taken together, the two fictions effectively mean that copyright law
in the United States has become the private preserve of media
conglomerates.
The catalyst for the expanded fictions in the copyright statute, of
course, is new communications technology, which has provided the
copyright industry a motivation for expanding the copyright
monopoly in order to secure a strangle hold on the electronic
dissemination of learning materials, the subject matter of copy-
right. To defeat the safeguards of free speech provided by the first
amendment and the limitations on Congress' copyright power in the
copyright clause, the copyrightists have resorted to a subtle, but
effective, tactic. They publish pronouncements about copyright law
that become a part of copyright culture, which then becomes a part
of thinking, especially judicial thinking, about copyright. The most
effective of these pronouncements seems to be that copyright is a
natural property right of the author, an idea that the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected in its first copyright case.' 4 General ignorance
about copyright law means that the copyrightists pronouncements
remain unrefuted, but it is a simple fact of life that explains the
success of this effort. Everyone tends to process information
according to their culture rather than the content of the informa-
tion. Thus, the idea that copyright is a property of authors to
protect the rights of authors deeply embedded in our culture
justifies the monopoly even while its primary beneficiary is the
manufacturer of the book, not the creator of the work.
The danger here explains why the copyright clause is a limitation
on, as well as a grant of, congressional power. These limitations
"3 These two fictions are derived from interpretations of 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) and 17
U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994), respectively.
14 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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come from the title of the Statute of Anne in England, 5 and the
reasons for the limitations in the English act are relevant to the
reasons for the limitations in the copyright clause. Briefly stated,
they were that copyright had been used as a device of censorship
and an instrument of monopoly, and the limitations were intended
to prevent a similar use of copyright in the future. The language
"for the encouragement of learning" in the title of the Statute of
Anne and its counterpart, "to promote the Progress of Science" in
the copyright clause were not mere slogans, but words that
expressed a substantive purpose, to prevent statutory copyright
from being an unlimited monopoly, the predicate of censorship, as
the experience with its predecessor proves beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The learning purpose, of course, is protected by the first amend-
ment and the copyright clause, protections that are a product of the
fact that both constitutional provisions are a product of the same
history of political oppression and press control generated by
religious controversy in England. The fact that the first amend-
ment protects the freedom of religion as well as the press is not
coincidental.
Nor is the fact that the copyright clause also protects the freedom
of speech, although in ways seldom acknowledged. The general
view seems to be that copyright protects the author's right of free
speech, but in fact it protects the public's right of free speech by
reason of the fact that it limits copyright to the author's own
original writings for a limited time, limitations that protect the
public domain. The point can be made clearer in light of the three
policies manifested in the copyright clause: the promotion of
learning, because it so states; the protection of the public domain,
because copyright is limited to original writings and exists only for
limited times; and the public's right of access, because "the
exclusive Right" that Congress can grant to authors is the exclusive
right of publication, which insures public access.'6 Recall that
under the Statute of Anne, copyright was available only for printed
books.
"'" An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the
authors or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned." Statute of Anne,
1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.).
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If, as the framers determined, constitutional protections against
the abuse of copyright were necessary when copyright was limited
to printed works, there is no reason to assume that the protections
are less needed when copyright is applied to the electronic dissemi-
nation of works. Watershed events such as the rise of the computer
call for a return to fundamentals, which in the case of copyright are
found in the copyright clause and the first amendment. They
provide the starting point for finding solutions to legal protection
for new means of disseminating information. The task of following
reason to its logical conclusion, however, is not easy when the self-
interest of a few media conglomerates are at risk. This is why it is
silly to assume that the first amendment has no relevance to the
learning process that is to a large extent governed by copyright law,
and dangerous to reject the distinction between the competitor who
infringes the copyright and the consumer who uses the work.
Copyrightists would do themselves-and the law-a great favor
by joining in the search for the proper solution without focussing
on how to use copyright law to enhance guaranteed profits, even
though the effort entails the abuse of constitutional rights and
corruption of the learning process. They should accept the fact that
first amendment proctections are not embedded in copyright law;
that the public interest is an important component of copyright law;
and that the consumer/competitor distinction is important for the
proper administration of copyright law.
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